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The opening decade of the 21st century will probably occupy a notable place in the history of 
the European economy. The early years of the decade coincided with the initial years of the 
culmination of the process of economic and monetary integration, following the launch of the 
common monetary policy and the single currency in 1999. And its closing years are witness to 
an international economic crisis of momentous scope and intensity.
The Spanish economy is among those that have most benefited from Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) membership. But the long upturn in which the benefits materialised has 
ended in a process of adjustment in a markedly adverse setting. From the mid-1990s to 2007, 
the Spanish economy enjoyed a phase of sustained economic growth in which real conver-
gence with the core EMU member countries advanced notably (GDP per capita relative to the 
EMU average increased by more than 15 pp from 79% to 95%) and in which the labour force 
and employment grew by almost 6 million (approximately 35%) and over 7.5 million (almost 
60%), respectively.
Yet significant imbalances built up in the period 1999-2007, ultimately resulting in an 
inevitable adjustment. Firstly, low interest rates and favourable financial conditions prompted 
strong growth in corporate and household credit and debt. Secondly, the continuous pressure 
of demand exceeded the responsiveness of the productive system, in spite of the significant 
structural transformations made and of the notable expansion in the labour factor, generating 
a positive inflation differential with the rest of the euro area that resulted in a strong apprecia-
tion of the real exchange rate, an erosion of price-competitiveness and a sharp increase in 
foreign debt. Finally, easy credit and demographic pressure fuelled a property boom, with 
surging house prices and an excessive concentration of productive resources in the construc-
tion sector.
These imbalances progressively undermined the foundations of the expansion, lead-
ing to a slowdown in economic activity. This started gradually but subsequently became more 
acute with the outbreak of the international financial crises of 2007-2008. As a result the ad-
justment became much more severe, as the crisis struck one of the most vulnerable parts of 
our economy, namely the continuing and growing resort to international funding, which at one 
point amounted to as much as 10% of GDP. per annum From having posted high growth 
rates, the economy moved over a brief period into a contractionary dynamic, with a fall-off in 
activity and job destruction in the second half of 2008. 
Assessing the effects of EMU on the behaviour of the Spanish economy over the past 
decade, from the standpoint both of the factors that underpinned the expansion and of those 
that have triggered the adjustment, is a complex exercise for many reasons. First, the start-up 
of EMU coincided in time with significant structural changes in the international economy, 
namely: i) the generalised use of information and communications technologies (ICTs); ii) the 
globalisation of economic activity, in a broad sense, i.e. including migratory flows, and iii) an 
abundance of liquidity and diminished risk aversion. Indeed, for much of the last decade, the 
spread of ICTs has given rise to growing international integration in trade and finance. And this, 
along with the greater participation of newly emerging economies in world markets, increased 
capital mobility and led to a new international division of labour. With globalisation, interna-
tional flows of goods and services and of capital, together with international migratory move-
ments, increased notably. This occurred while certain structural changes and the greater ef-
1 Introduction
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fectiveness of macroeconomic policies were providing for a better absorption of economic 
shocks, with a lesser response by output, employment and inflation. Under these conditions, 
the integration of capital markets and the emergence of new financial products shaped, for 
much of the decade, a setting marked by more readily available credit, abundant liquidity and 
the low cost of risk. This situation would turn around dramatically following the effects of the 
international financial crisis, which superimposed themselves on the adjustment that the Span-
ish economy had embarked upon a few quarters earlier, making it more complex and costly. It 
will thus be very difficult to disentangle the contribution of each process separately.
Secondly, EMU membership was conditional upon compliance with a series of re-
quirements laid down in the Maastricht Treaty, to ensure a high degree of nominal conver-
gence among the member countries. This was the basis for the application of a single mone-
tary policy that would not generate unsustainable monetary and financial pressures, given the 
appropriate conditions of homogeneity in place.1 However, in the mid-1990s, Spain was one 
of the candidates for Monetary Union membership that was furthest from meeting the require-
ments in the Treaty. Accordingly, significant changes had to be made to the policy stance, 
along with specific reforms to help achieve the required objectives. This effort meant that some 
of the positive effects of Monetary Union on the Spanish economy began to be felt before the 
Union was formally in place. EMU membership aside, nonetheless, it should be borne in mind 
that the European Union had also developed mechanisms (including the Structural and Cohe-
sion Funds) to facilitate the real convergence of the economies with lower levels of welfare. 
Thanks to this, Spain was the recipient during this period of a considerable volume of capital 
transfers, which provided for notable infrastructure development and, moreover, was key to 
promoting greater convergence in per capita income across Spanish regions [see, for exam-
ple, De la Fuente (2003)]. Yet now a high degree of real convergence has been attained, 
Spain’s net financial contribution to the European Union has moved to a position of balance, 
so that this impulse had disappeared at the end of the period.
Lastly, it should be stressed that a full analysis of the impact of EMU on the Spanish 
economy unquestionably requires a broader time perspective than that provided by the first 
ten years of membership. Until very recently the Spanish economy was enjoying a lasting ex-
pansion that benefited from some of the factors associated with Monetary Union. In the com-
ing years the outcome of the current adjustment will reveal how sound the Spanish economy’s 
structural fundamentals deriving from EMU membership really are, and to what extent these 
fundamentals are going to allow growth potential to remain high. In this respect, it is worth 
considering to what extent the increase in debt, the appreciation of the real exchange rate and 
the concentration of resources in construction may have been excessive and in what way 
these imbalances may influence future developments in the Spanish economy in the new in-
ternational setting arising from the financial crisis and the slowdown in the world economy. 
This paper analyses the Spanish economy’s experience in the first decade of EMU. It 
is structured as follows. Section 2 defines the starting conditions of the Spanish economy, 
when there was only a commitment to join monetary union as a founding member. Section 3 
describes the main transformations made to attain this objective, and details the advantages 
of belonging to the euro area compared with remaining outside. Section 4 describes the de-
velopments in the economic variables that best represent the main events of the past decade, 
focusing on the factors underpinning the expansion and the increase in convergence, and on 
1. Indeed, some of these requirements paved the way for the subsequent setting of a series of fiscal policy rules to ensure 
budgetary rigour on the part of the member countries. These rules seek to prevent a lack of fiscal discipline distorting 
monetary policy decisions.
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the imbalances that triggered the start of the adjustment. Section 5 attempts to assess the 
scope of these imbalances using an intertemporal consumption model, a tool frequently used 
to analyse international macroeconomics issues, explicitly incorporating the behaviour of the 
real estate sector. Section 6 then analyses the sources of the recent recession, a combination 
of internal adjustment factors and the effects of the international crisis, and describes the fun-
damentals of the process of adjustment towards a new path of sustained economic growth. 
Finally, Section 7 presents the main conclusions of this assessment of the behaviour of the 
Spanish economy during the first ten years of EMU membership. 
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Accession to EMU marked the culmination of lengthy efforts to attain a regime of macroeco-
nomic stability in Spain. This was achieved by a series of transformations that, on balance, 
shaped the starting point for the long expansion and subsequent adjustment of the Spanish 
economy within EMU [see Malo de Molina (2005 and 2007)].
In the early 1990s the imbalances that had built up with the sharp – but uneven – ex-
pansion in the second half of the previous decade led to a major macroeconomic crisis and 
to an abrupt and deep recession that meant that the entire convergence strategy had to be 
reconsidered. The diffi culties facing most European countries and widening macroeconomic 
divergences brought about a delay in the monetary integration timetable that ultimately gave 
the Spanish economy suffi cient time to right its course.
The change in tack of the Spanish economy was based on keeping the monetary pol-
icy stance anchored to the objective of joining the Monetary Union as soon as possible, ideally 
from its creation. This involved implementing structural changes that the economy required, the 
need for which had been particularly evident during the sharp crisis in the early 1990s, along 
with a suffi ciently ambitious macroeconomic stability strategy based on realistic assumptions. 
In adopting this stance, it was decided to prioritise the macroeconomic stability that EMU could 
provide and it was expected that the change in macroeconomic regime would allow the intro-
duction of certain incentives for the structural reforms needed to equip the Spanish economy 
with the fl exibility that participation in a monetary union requires.
The employment adjustments induced by the sharp recession in the 1990s made for 
considerable productivity gains that enabled mark-ups and profi t levels to be restored. The 
adjustments fi rstly led to a considerable rejuvenation and to an increase in the educational 
attainment and skills of workforces which, in many cases, had not been able to adapt to the 
technological changes that had begun to be introduced into the productive system. In turn, the 
high fi nancial costs induced by a stability-geared monetary policy requiring high interest rates 
prompted a reduction in excess external fi nancing, allowing very sound fi nancial positions to 
be attained. The adjustment was particularly costly in terms of unemployment, which rose to 
close to 25% of the labour force, but it placed businesses in a very healthy and competitive 
position. The recession proved relatively short-lived and the start of the recovery, underpinned 
by the macroeconomic policies set in place and by the structural reforms that were beginning 
to be rolled out, helped revive employment creation. The experience of the rapid increase in un-
employment triggered by the economic downturn prompted a change in the attitude of social 
agents, who now better appreciated the need for structural reforms in the workings of many 
markets and institutions, particularly in the labour market, and were somewhat more sensitive 
to the effects of wage rises on the behaviour of employment and infl ation. This change was, 
at least incipiently, in the direction required to achieve behaviour compatible with a permanent 
regime of macroeconomic stability.
The relatively short duration of the contractionary phase prior to the start of the expan-
sion had much to do with the role played by the adjustment of the exchange rate. Unavoidable 
devaluations of the peseta occurred at that time as a result of the markets sanctioning econom-
ic policies and price and wage formation practices that were not consistent with exchange-
rate stability. Once the markets were aware of the unsustainability of the cumulative losses in 
competitiveness and of the level of the external defi cit that had to be fi nanced, speculative 
2 The starting point: adjustments prior to EMU accession
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pressures made it impossible to maintain exchange-rate commitments. When that happened, 
accepting even a certain overreaction that would eventually lead to EMU accession with a rela-
tively favourable conversion rate became inevitable. The exchange rate adjustment acted as a 
swift and effective mechanism for absorbing the imbalances that had built up, and was instru-
mental in engineering the emergence from recession according to the traditional pattern, based 
on recovery in net external demand and in corporate surpluses, followed by a reactivation of 
productive investment and of household consumption. The exchange-rate level reached fol-
lowing the successive devaluations provided signifi cant leeway not only to consolidate the dy-
namism of activity in the sector most exposed to competition but also to subsequently absorb 
the additional erosion in the behaviour of relative prices. All these factors ultimately contributed 
positively to shaping a favourable starting point for the success of monetary integration.
Yet such favourable results from the exchange-rate depreciation were only possible 
because, unlike the pattern of conduct prevailing in the past, under which agents reacted im-
mediately to protect themselves from purchasing power losses and gains in competitiveness 
were short-lived, the markedly stabilising nature of the convergence policy and the monetary 
policy infl ation targets helped prevent a rapid dissipation of the effect of the parity adjust-
ment. This is a matter of great importance, since integration into the Monetary Union would 
entail renouncing the use of this instrument in any future processes of adjustment. Indeed, 
the complexity of the severe adjustment the Spanish economy is undergoing stems not only 
from the adverse international fi nancial conditions and from the global recessionary setting in 
which it is taking place, but also from the diffi culty and uncertainty inherent in the correction of 
accumulated imbalances without an independent monetary policy and without the possibility 
of resorting to the relative price adjustment through an exchange rate realignment. That said, 
the serious diffi culties that certain economies with exchange-rate fl exibility and little tradition of 
macroeconomic stability have experienced have once more highlighted the sizeable protection 
that euro area membership provides against abrupt fi nancial shocks.
In short, the convergence drive to comply with the criteria laid down for EMU ac-
cession proved particularly complex and eventful, although ultimately satisfactory. In turn, the 
change of tack needed in budgetary policy to curb the growing budget defi cit, amid a very 
marked recession, laid the foundations for resuming the path of consolidation that would con-
tribute signifi cantly to providing the appropriate base from which to attain the convergence 
targets and to benefi t from the stimulating aspects of participation in the euro area.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 15 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 0901
From this starting point, and before considering the trajectory of the Spanish economy within 
the euro area, we may ask what was the scope of the transformations in macroeconomic ar-
rangements entailed by entry into the area. Probably, the most telling consequence of EMU 
membership is the change in how imbalances and their attendant adjustments manifest them-
selves. Set against the significance of the external financial constraint existing for countries 
with monetary sovereignty, strains tend to build up within the euro area mainly in terms of loss 
of competitiveness and excess debt. And, in respect of adjustment, the impossibility of altering 
the exchange-rate relationship shifts the response to the weakening of demand and the re-
duction in debt levels towards flexibility in the functioning of markets and in cost and price 
formation. If wage and price formation has not become more flexible, adjustment in the face 
of aggregate shocks will fall on quantities, whereby the process will be slower and, above all, 
much more costly, given the adverse effect this may have on human capital.
Compliance with the convergence criteria and participation in the euro from the outset 
entailed attaining a regime of macroeconomic stability that would have hardly been achievable 
outside the area, as the troubled course of previous stabilisation attempts had demonstrated. 
On the infl ation front a substantial reduction was brought about, despite the fact that, as will 
be seen below, convergence in terms of price stability has not been fully achieved. On all the 
studies available, the Spanish economy had comparatively high sacrifi ce ratios before joining 
the euro area; accordingly, the reduction in infl ation entailed considerable losses in output and 
higher unemployment which, moreover, had a sizeable permanent component, given that a no-
table presence of hysteresis was apparent in the behaviour of the Spanish labour market (see 
Dolado and Jimeno, 1997). However, the same studies associated considerable benefi ts with 
reducing infl ation that were clearly greater than the attendant costs. In the short run, this was 
the result of interaction with an unindexed tax system and of a legal system in which all limits 
are set in nominal terms. And in the long run, because the creation of a setting characterised 
by confi dence conducive to profi table investment allows the potential level of per capita income 
to be raised.
An essential component of the regime of macroeconomic stability was fi scal consoli-
dation. This was one of the requirements laid down in the Maastricht Treaty and enabled Spain 
to progress from posting defi cits of above 7% in the early 1990s to a surplus position based on 
broad social consensus on the need for the budget to be in balance over the business cycle. 
This improved fi scal position allowed the potential crowding-out effects and the risk premiums 
associated with a lack of fi scal discipline to be sharply curtailed, and macroeconomic manage-
ment and the very dynamics of public fi nances benefi ted accordingly. At the same time, the 
substantial reduction in Spain’s nominal divergences with its main trading partners and the 
elimination of the speculative component of the exchange rate lessened the costs of trading for 
fi rms, increasing their profi tability, and reduced the costs of tourism for individuals. The elimina-
tion of the risks of a currency depreciation were not only decisive in reducing the risk premiums 
associated with the dangers of macroeconomic instability; they also prompted a cut in the rela-
tive cost of trade with the euro area and contributed to forging closer trading relations with, and 
to smoothing integration into, this area, allowing comparative advantages to be harnessed.
EMU membership ensures interest rates consistent with the area’s price stability 
standards. The biggest consequence of all these changes was, therefore, a considerable and 
permanent reduction in interest rates. A return to rate increases characteristic of situations 
3 The change in macroeconomic regime
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of macroeconomic and exchange-rate instability, entailing high risk premiums for the Span-
ish economy, was inconceivable. Accentuating this reduction in rates was the predominantly 
expansionary monetary policy adopted by the area for most of the period, and the accommo-
dative fi nancial conditions that have prevailed worldwide, meaning that interest rates reached 
abnormally low levels, even for the area’s core countries.
As a result, Spanish households and fi rms alike saw their borrowing capacity increase. 
And this had forceful expansionary effects on demand in the economy. Several analyses have 
sought to estimate the intensity of these effects, distinguishing between the various chan-
nels (the substitution effect, income effect and wealth effect) through which they operate. One 
central aspect of agents’ increased borrowing capacity derived from the disappearance of the 
constraint arising from country-specifi c macroeconomic risk, given the absence of exchange 
rate differentiation. Consequently, when attracting the fi nancing fl ows required, the main deter-
minant was, under normal fi nancial market operating conditions, the return/risk profi le of the 
individual borrower, which permitted a considerable increase in the economy’s capitalisation. 
More recently, international market fi nancing conditions have changed drastically following the 
abrupt fi nancial crisis, and dependence on external fi nance has become an unexpected fac-
tor of vulnerability, since it involves something of a return to a more local orientation for these 
markets.
Lastly, we should not forget the role played by EMU membership in establishing 
powerful stimuli to shift the stance of policies that remain under national sovereignty towards 
a framework of medium-term stability and growth. The fi scal policy rules are, in substance, 
common to all the EU countries, but EMU membership gives fi scal policy a more decisive 
role and reinforces the factors favouring an appropriately counter-cyclical and stabilising use 
of demand. In parallel, structural reform policies take on signifi cant importance for a country 
belonging to a monetary union. Indeed, given the constraints on the traditional instruments 
for regulating aggregate demand and the insuffi cient labour mobility in the area (due, among 
other matters, to purely cultural factors), such policies become the most effective resource 
available to the authorities to encourage agents’ adaptation to the requirements of the new 
environment.
Evidently, the disciplining infl uence of the policies has been key to the behaviour of the 
core of the public sector (State and Social Security), which moved from sizeable defi cits to a 
surplus position, with the public debt/GDP ratio shrinking substantially. However, the change is 
not so apparent in the case of the regional and local governments, since these assumed cur-
rent expenditure commitments on the basis of revenue with a sizeable temporary component, 
probably due to the fact that the arrangements in place did not involve a suffi cient degree of fi s-
cal co-responsibility. In fact, with the adjustment that suddenly began at the end of the period, 
the high sensitivity of overall general government revenue to the pattern of deceleration and 
subsequent contraction of the economy was highlighted, so that the structural improvement in 
public fi nances can be expected to be ultimately less than thought.
In the case of the structural reform policies, headway has been more uneven across 
sectors and markets, and has also depended on the territorial distribution of competencies. In 
the case of certain privatisation and liberalisation policies, some progress has been reported, 
enabling programmes adopted in previous stages to be furthered. But this has not been the 
case in certain services branches or, above all, in the labour market. The only relief to the la-
bour market stemmed from the sharp infl ux of immigrants and from the reduction in hysteresis, 
evidenced by the notable decline in long-term unemployment and in the NAIRU (non-accelerat-
ing-infl ation rate of unemployment) in the Spanish economy during the expansion.
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The absence of far-reaching labour reforms has left the workings of the labour mar-
ket largely intact. Such workings are characterised by considerable rigidity in wage-bargain-
ing and wage-setting mechanisms and by a deep-seated dichotomy in hiring arrangements 
which tends to shift the intensity of the adjustment onto employment, as the explosive rise in 
unemployment in previous recessions has evidenced. This ineffi ciency goes unnoticed while 
conditions conducive to economic dynamism are in place. But it tends to exacerbate and ac-
centuate the virulence of adjustments as employment acts as a mechanism for the spread and 
amplifi cation of adjustment effects rather than inducing a less costly adjustment in wages.
From this perspective it is worth considering the benefi ts that have arisen from mon-
etary integration compared with the effects that would have come about had the economy 
remained outside EMU. Unquestionably, the tendencies towards macroeconomic instability 
would have been considerably greater outside, so that the economy would not have been 
capable of the same degree of expansion and convergence, and the costs of stabilising efforts 
would have been greater. Further, the economy would have not have enjoyed the protection 
against global and idiosyncratic fi nancial shocks provided by EMU membership. Nonetheless, 
the tendency for greater specialisation in the economy in some specifi c industries (such as 
construction and related activities) might have been less strong and exposure to real asym-
metrical shocks outside the area more limited. It is possible, too, that integration may have 
been conducive to trade with an area whose growth has been very small when compared with 
the Americas or Asia, which may have contributed to increasing net borrowing.
Finally, it might be ventured that the possibility of building up imbalances would have 
been less outside the euro area. One risk factor involved in belonging to a monetary area is 
the possibility that macroeconomic imbalances may be built up and amplifi ed, delaying the 
necessary adjustment. This is because the disciplining factors that arise from the existence of 
a market price for the country’s macroeconomic risk are absent. Hence it is possible that, in 
the absence of risks to macroeconomic stability, interest rate cuts are conducive to a larger 
increase in household and corporate debt than would have been the case had EMU member-
ship not been an option. Seen from another angle, that entails the possibility of reaching a level 
of net borrowing for the economy as a whole that would not have been possible outside EMU. 
Before reaching such levels an adjustment of fi nancial conditions, of domestic demand and of 
the rate of growth would have been triggered by means of exchange rate and long-term inter-
est rate pressures.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 19 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 0901
This section summarises the key features of the Spanish economy’s expansion during the 
period it has been a member of EMU. Firstly, it describes the main macroeconomic variables 
in terms of the level of economic activity, employment, productivity and inflation, distinguishing 
between the period prior to EMU entry and the subsequent period, and comparing with other 
advanced countries and possible areas of reference. Secondly, it analyses the main imbal-
ances that built up during the long expansion – the appreciation of the real exchange rate and 
the increase in the external deficit, the property boom, and the rise in the levels of corporate 
and household debt – which would trigger the subsequent process of adjustment.
4.1 The expansionary phase: 1999-2007
In an initial approach to the performance of the Spanish economy in EMU, Table 4.1.1 shows 
the annual average growth rates of GDP, population and per capita income (with the corre-
sponding standard deviations) recorded in Spain in the nine years up to the creation of EMU 
(1990-1998) and in the nine subsequent years (1999-2007).1 Comparison with the behaviour 
of other countries (the United States, the three biggest euro area members – Germany, France 
and Italy – and the euro area itself) in both periods gives a first impression of the potential im-
pact of EMU on the growth of the Spanish economy.
As can be seen, while the GDP growth rate for the United States declined by 0.3 pp 
from one period to the next and held stable for the euro area, the pace of growth climbed by 
1 pp for the Spanish economy, reversing the negative growth differential with the United States 
before 1999 (0.3 pp) to a positive difference of 1 pp. This increase is particularly notable inso-
far as the growth gap between the United States and the euro area in the second period was, 
at 0.5 pp, still considerable.
Also of note was the reduction in the variability of GDP growth, especially in the 
United States. This appeared to be following on from the structural reduction in business cycle 
fluctuations that came to be known as the “Great Moderation”.2 A similar reduction in GDP 
volatility was perceptible in the euro area, although it did not appear to be extensive to all the 
member countries. Indeed, in the three biggest euro area economies the fluctuations in output 
seem to be on a similar scale before and after the creation of EMU. By contrast, in Spain there 
was a most significant reduction in the volatility of GDP growth: from being the country with 
the biggest fluctuations it became that showing least volatility. That would suggest that expan-
sionary phases have become longer and more stable, reflecting the materialisation of the 
structural improvements in macroeconomic workings that was expected from EMU member-
ship.
A very important factor behind the growth of economic activity in Spain during the 
period 1997-2007 was the notable demographic expansion. Indeed, before 1999, and as in 
the other European countries, population growth was very small, especially when compared 
with that in the United States. This gap in population increases actually explains the differ-
ences in GDP growth, since per capita income in the euro area was expanding at the same 
4 The performance of the Spanish economy in EMU
1. The use of these average growth rates over a relatively long period means that the different cyclical positions of the 
economies at each point in time are not the main determinant of the differences highlighted in the text. 2. See McConnell 
and Pérez-Quirós (2000), who identify a structural change in US GDP volatility in the mid-1980s. 
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pace as that in the United States. In any event, this aggregate development in the euro area 
masked the differences in the behaviour of the large euro area countries which, in terms of per 
capita income, were slipping relative to the United States and to the other countries, including 
Spain, which was posting an annual average increase in per capita income of 2.5% and was 
narrowing the differences both with respect to the EU-3 and the United States.
From the onset of EMU, the population in Spain acceleration sharply, growing at an 
annual average rate of 1.4%, 0.4 pp more than in the United States. As earlier discussed in the 
introduction, this sizeable demographic expansion was the result, above all, of a massive influx 
of immigrants, but also of the increase in Spaniards’ life expectancy which, at present, stands 
at one of the highest levels for the developed countries. Growth in per capita income in Spain 
fell by 0.1 pp, while in the euro area as a whole and in the United States the dynamism of the 
previous period was sustained and in the three biggest countries in the area it was increased. 
Accordingly, Spain’s rate of convergence fell slightly both relative to the euro area (on Eurostat 
figures the per capita income gap is only 3%) and to the United States (though in this case the 
gap is 30%). Although the euro area’s biggest countries raised the average growth of their per 
capita income after 1999, this is still far removed from US growth rates.
Table 4.1.2 offers some information on the sources of per capita income growth over the 
last decade, breaking this growth down into two different factors: labour intensity and productiv-
ity. Greater labour utilisation can be achieved either through increases in the employment rate (the 
proportion of the working-age population in employment)3 or increases in hours worked per em-
ployee. In turn, the employment rate can be broken down into the participation rate (the percent-
age of the working-age population in employment or actively seeking employment) and (the in-
verse of) the unemployment rate (percentage of the labour force seeking employment). 
As can be observed, labour intensity has been much greater in the United States than 
in the euro area. Indeed, the US employment rate has constantly maintained a gap of over 
6 pp relative to that of the euro area and annual average hours worked are currently 10% 
higher in the United States. Secondly, the behaviour of the US and European economies be-
fore and after the creation of EMU has been radically different. From 1989 to 1998, the em-
ployment rates in both areas held stable; however, from 1999 there was a considerable in-
emocniatipacrePnoitalupoPPDG
1990-1998 1999-2007 1990-1998 1999-2007 1990-1998 1999-2007
7.17.10.12.17.20.3setatSdetinU
(1.5) (1.1) (0.1) (0.1) (1.5) (1.1)
4.11.13.04.07.15.1)b(3-UE
(1.0) (1.0) (0.3) (0.1) (1.1) (1.1)
7.17.15.04.02.21.221-aeraoruE
(1.3) (1.0) (0.2) (0.1) (1.2) (1.1)
4.25.24.12.07.37.2niapS
(1.9) (0.7) (0.1) (0.4) (1.9) (1.1)
GROWTH OF GDP, POPULATION AND PER CAPITA INCOME
Average annual rate (a)
TABLE 4.1.1
SOURCE: Eurostat.
a. The standard deviation is in brackets.
b. The EU-3 aggregate includes Germany, France and Italy.
3. To make international comparisons easier, the working-age population is taken to be that in the 15-64 age range. 
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crease in that in the euro area and a reduction in that in the United States. Adding to this the 
fact that average hours worked in the United States have also fallen over this period (albeit at 
a much lesser pace than in the euro area) suggests that while the growth of US per capita in-
come after 1999 has been based exclusively on the improved efficiency of the labour factor, in 
the euro area labour intensity has played a prominent role. Thirdly, in this connection Spain 
represents an extreme case within the euro area, since from 1999 its labour intensity has in-
creased significantly, the employment rate reaching the euro area average (and exceeding that 
of the three biggest economies) while, at the same time, it has maintained a positive gap with 
regard to average hours worked. If we factor in the enormous growth of the population in our 
country in this period, it is not surprising that Spain has created more than one-third of all 
employment generated in the euro area during these years.
The strong increase in the Spanish economy’s employment rate from the start of EMU 
to 2007 stemmed in virtually equal proportions from an increase in the participation rate and a 
reduction in the unemployment rate. The rise in the participation rate was driven by greater 
female participation and by immigration. As Chart 4.1.1 shows, the inflow of immigrants into 
Spain began to reach a significant scale in the years immediately before the creation of EMU. 
Subsequently, immigration became progressively greater so that, from 2002 onwards, its con-
tribution to the growth of total employment was higher than that of nationals. Indeed, although 
the Spanish economy began to destroy employment at the aggregate level in mid-2008, im-
migrant employment continued increasing until the end of the year. The enormous influx of 
immigrants into the Spanish economy can be explained by three types of factors: a) factors 
responsible for their departure from their country of origin; b) permanent factors of attraction; 
and c) temporary factors of attraction. Under the first category, the difference between the 
standard of living of immigrants’ countries of origin and that of the developed countries (includ-
ing both per capita income and the degree of inequality of its distribution) should be high-
lighted. Under the second category the most significant factors are the presence of other im-
migrants of the same and of different nationalities in the host country (an effect for which the 
respective saturation points are estimated, although in Spain they are apparently far from hav-
ing been reached), and how developed the welfare state is. Temporary factors relate to the 
higher growth of the Spanish economy relative to the other developed countries, although 
faced with the worsening of economic activity, return migration flows to home countries or 
emigration flows to other countries may be expected.4
Employment rate Participation rate Unemployment rate Average hours
1989 1998 2007 1989 1998 2007 1989 1998 2007 1989 1998 2007
United States 73.1 73.8 71.7 77.1 77.3 75.2 5.3 4.5 4.6 1,821 1,867 1,778
075,1146,1586,17.71.113.83.076.665.568.462.959.95)b(3-UE
Euro area-12 58.5 59.0 65.7 63.7 66.5 71.1 8.2 11.2 7.4 1,722 1,669 1,608
536,1237,1357,13.87.813.716.177.262.856.560.150.84niapS
LABOUR UTILISATION
Average annual level (a)
TABLE 4.1.2
SOURCE: Eurostat.
a. There may be breaks in the series.
b. The EU-3 aggregate includes Germany, France and Italy.
4. A simple simulation shows that if per capita income in Spain had grown the same as in the other OECD European 
countries, numbers of immigrants arriving since 1998 would be around 400,000 fewer, or 9% less than the actual num-
bers for 2007. On return migration flows, see, for example, Izquierdo et al. (2008). 
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In any event, the increase in national employment has also been very significant in the 
period in question, due primarily to the notable rise in the female participation rate (Chart 4.1.2).5 
In fact, the average annual reduction in the gap between the female and male rates has been 
1 pp, and there is still considerable room for further narrowing both when comparing with the 
average participation rate of the most advanced countries (61.4% in Spain against 65.1% in 
the euro area) and bearing in mind the fact that the female cohorts above the minimum work-
ing age show significantly lower participation rates than those in which they first enter the la-
bour market. This chart also clearly highlights how immigrants who have come to Spain during 
these years have done so for purely economic reasons: their aggregate participation rate is 
practically identical to that of male nationals.
As regards the unemployment rate, it is difficult to quantify precisely the causes of its 
sharp reduction. Some papers have attempted to assess the extent to which the labour re-
forms since the early 1990s have contributed to lowering the structural rate of unemployment 
EMPLOYMENT IN SPAIN
Annual growth and contributions
CHART 4.1.1
SOURCE: Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE).
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
 NATIONALS
 IMMIGRANTS
 TOTAL
%
PARTICIPATION RATE IN SPAIN CHART 4.1.2
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
 MALE
 FEMALE
 IMMIGRANTS
%
SOURCE: INE.
5. Some papers have posited a potential relationship between immigration and the increase in the female participation 
rate [see, for example, OEP (2006)].  
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[see, for example, Bentolila and Jimeno (2006), and Izquierdo and Regil (2007)], although there 
appears to be some consensus that the scope of these reforms is not sufficient to explain 
such a large and rapid reduction in the unemployment rate. Thus, other papers attribute part 
of the reduction to immigration [see, for example, Bentolila, Dolado and Jimeno (2009)], and 
to the wage restraint during these years prompted, among other factors, by the discipline in-
duced by the process of convergence towards EMU.
Moving to the second of the per capita income components, labour productivity, 
Table 4.1.3 presents the two indicators habitually used to measure it: apparent labour pro-
ductivity and total factor productivity (TFP). This table highlights once again the notable di-
chotomy between the performance of the US economy and that of the euro area before and 
after 1999. US labour productivity, which was growing less than in the euro area before 1998, 
quickened significantly in the subsequent decade, in clear contrast to the slowdown re-
corded in the euro area; accordingly, its growth was almost 1 pp higher in annual average 
terms. As a result, the euro area ceased to converge with the United States in terms of the 
degree of efficiency with which the labour factor is used. From this standpoint, Spain’s case 
is even more accentuated than that of the euro area, since the average increase in labour 
productivity fell by half following the introduction of the euro, even though it started from 
lower levels than those of the area.
The higher growth of US labour productivity in the second period considered was 
the outcome, above all, of the acceleration in TFP (whose annual average growth practi-
cally doubled) but also of the step-up in investment, in clear contrast to developments in 
the euro area and in most of its members. This result is perhaps surprising when it is borne 
in mind that the weight of gross fixed capital formation in GDP is 27% in Spain, 21% in the 
euro area and 19% in the United States. Yet it should be taken into account that the stock 
of capital used to calculate TFP is quality-adjusted, i.e. not all investment goods are con-
sidered to be equally productive. Specifically, this reflects the fact that the euro area (and 
Spain) has fallen behind in incorporating the new ICTs into its productive system and, in 
Spain’s specific case, it shows the strong increase in housing investment. Yet in the euro 
area, TFP growth has eased in the past 10 years, although not across the board; in fact, 
Germany has managed to improve its levels, albeit without attaining those of the United 
States, and France has maintained them at pre-EMU levels, which were similar to those 
now attained by the United States.
PFToitarruobal/latipaCdekrowruoh/PDG
1990-1998 1999-2007 1990-1998 1999-2007 1990-1998 1999-2007
9.05.05.31.31.25.1setatSdetinU
(1.0) (0.8) (1.2) (1.2) (0.8) (0.8)
5.05.03.23.33.16.1)b(3-UE
(1.0) (0.7) (0.8) (0.9) (0.9) (0.6)
5.09.02.22.33.10.2Euro area-12
(0.6) (0.6) (0.8) (0.6) (0.7) (0.5)
0.04.03.23.37.05.1niapS
(1.6) (0.5) (1.7) (0.7) (1.4) (0.3)
LABOUR AND TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY
Average annual rate (a)
TABLE 4.1.3
SOURCES: Eurostat, EU-KLEMS and AMECO.
a. The standard deviation is in brackets.
b. The EU-3 aggregate includes Germany, France and Italy.
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In Spain’s case, average TFP growth since the introduction of the euro has been virtu-
ally zero. This is surprising since, although there are admittedly still deficiencies in the endow-
ment of factors of production that may explain why Spanish productivity levels are lower than 
in other European countries (less skilled human capital, a very low stock of technology know-
how due to low investment in R&D, a relatively unfavourable business environment owing to 
the fact that the degree of competition in certain services and labour markets is low, an under-
developed enterprise culture, a high administrative burden, etc.), there has also been progress 
on these fronts that should have resulted in higher productivity growth. 
Measurement and estimation difficulties aside, there are in principle several reasons 
that may explain this slowdown in TFP. First, the bias in growth towards relatively unskilled-
labour-intensive activities (construction and services) has brought about a negative composi-
tion effect on productivity. However, this composition effect cannot explain in full the slowdown 
in TFP, since it has been observed practically across the board in all sectors of activity. Further, 
the higher level of educational attainment and the greater weight in employment of skilled jobs 
also generate a composition effect of the opposite sign that largely offsets that stemming from 
the rise in the weight of jobs in lower-productivity sectors. Second, just as labour availability 
may have been conducive to specialisation in specific productive sectors, it may also have 
prompted firms to use less advanced technologies. Finally, the complementarity between new 
technologies and corporate restructuring, a primary source of the TFP gains observed in other 
countries, may have been hampered in Spain’s case by labour regulations that restrict flexible 
working arrangements at firms to the use of temporary contracts.
The buoyant activity and headway in convergence experienced by the Spanish econ-
omy within EMU have arisen from the demand and supply-side conditions that its stability re-
gime favoured. But the information available to date suggests that the strength of demand in 
the economy may have been too great for the capacity of expansion of the supply side, since 
the increase in productivity was very moderate and the reduction in the unemployment rate 
was based, to some extent, on the hiring of lower-skilled workers.
One analytical approach to tackling this question involves estimating the output gap, 
i.e. the difference between actual GDP and the level of output that could be attained without 
generating inflationary pressures. It is well known that this potential level of output is not ob-
servable, but there are several procedures for estimating it. Apart from the most commonly 
used options, based on purely statistical techniques which involve filtering the series under 
study without taking into account any of the conditions imposed by economic theory, there are 
other, much more informative procedures that introduce specific constraints suggested by 
economic theory and which are not too controversial among researchers. 
For instance, Galí et al. (2007) have developed a procedure that highlights a close 
relationship between the output gap and the degree of inefficiency existing in an economy. 
This lack of efficiency is determined by two factors. Firstly, that arising from the non-competi-
tive functioning of the market for goods and services, which is reflected in the behaviour of the 
mark-up of product price over marginal production cost, i.e. in firms’ monopoly power. The 
basis for this is that, in the absence of market failings, perfect competition in markets reduces 
the equilibrium level of prices which, under normal conditions, increases the amount of the 
good produced and traded, which is one of the determinants of the level of consumer welfare. 
In this way, monopoly power leads to an inefficiently low level of production of goods and 
services. Secondly, there is the inefficiency that stems from the non-competitive functioning of 
the labour market, which is reflected in the mark-up of real wages over consumers’ valuation 
of leisure (which is the second determinant of the level of agents’ welfare), i.e. the marginal rate 
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of substitution between consumption and leisure. In this case, the explanation is that if real 
wages are higher than the maximum price workers are prepared to pay to increase their leisure 
time, then an inefficiently low number of workers will be hired at an inefficiently high cost.6
As can be seen in Chart 4.1.3, the inefficiency gap7 has shown some volatility since 
the 1980s. This measure of the output gap based on the degree of inefficiency suggests that, since 
1980, the Spanish economy has had two clearly recessionary phases (1983-1986 and 1993-1998) 
and two expansionary phases (1987-1992 and 1999-2007). The results obtained for 2008 involve 
a considerable turnaround in the economy’s cyclical position, comparable only in terms of its inten-
sity to the events that followed the second oil shock in the early 1980s; everything suggests that, in 
2009, the inefficiency gap will exceed the historical low reached in 1985.
Chart 4.1.4 depicts the disaggregation of the inefficiency gap into the product market 
mark-up and the labour market mark-up. Firstly, the fluctuations in the labour market mark-up 
are much greater than those of the market for goods and services (note that the chart has dif-
ferent scales for each variable), meaning that, as in Galí et al. (2007), labour market inefficien-
cies (with the sign changed) are the main determinants of changes in the aggregate degree of 
inefficiency. This might be a consequence of the fact that a substantial proportion of the mar-
kets for goods and services are open to international competition, which exerts a very signifi-
cant disciplining effect on tradeable goods markets. Secondly, the contemporaneous correla-
tion between both mark-ups is not statistically significant. This may be a consequence of the 
presence of the public sector, which can influence private agents’ decisions both through the 
regulations it imposes on markets and through the taxes and subsidies it sets. Thirdly, the re-
cessions the Spanish economy has undergone appear always to have been preceded by a 
significant increase in product market mark-ups, so that the increase in monopoly power 
linked to demand pressure, when the expansionary phase matures, acts as a trigger for such 
recessions. This process is followed by a significant increase in the wage mark-up which, 
subsequently, further heightens recessionary processes. Likewise, expansions are also pre-
INEFFICIENCY GAP
As a percentage of GDP
CHART 4.1.3
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
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6. To calculate these mark-ups it is necessary to make assumptions regarding firms’ production technology and con-
sumer preferences. In this connection, we follow the recommendations of Galí et al. (2007), with three particularities: i) 
consumers also obtain utility from the housing they purchase; ii) the wages received by households exclude all types of 
contributions and direct taxes; and iii) producer prices exclude indirect taxes. 7. Given the definition of inefficiency gap, 
it might be expected always to be negative; however, for ease of comparison with other methods of calculating the 
output gap, it is normalised to zero mean in the period considered. 
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ceded by an increase in price mark-ups, once the cyclical adjustment leads to a significant 
reduction in labour market inefficiencies.
4.2 Imbalances
As highlighted, the growth in the Spanish economy in the 1999-2007 period was based on 
foundations that could not be maintained indefinitely. The notable demand stimulus was only 
partially accommodated by a quantitative expansion of output, based on an exceptional in-
crease in the rate of employment. This was not adequately matched by an improvement in 
productivity, since the capitalisation of the economy failed to provide for convergence on the 
levels prevailing in the more developed countries and gains in efficiency were not sufficiently 
sharp. A series of imbalances thus began to emerge during this period, undermining the dy-
namism of the expansion. And, as there were no significant changes in agents’ patterns of 
behaviour, the imbalances led to the need for an adjustment. As is usually the case in econom-
ics, all these imbalances are very closely related, given that they are not generated sequen-
tially but jointly and in a mutually reinforcing fashion. For the purposes of presentation, the 
imbalances have been grouped under three major headings: a) inflation differentials, the ap-
preciation of the real exchange rate and the external financing of the economy; b) property 
sector developments; and c) household and corporate debt.
4.2.1 INFLATION DIFFERENTIALS, APPRECIATION OF THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE AND THE FINANCING
OF THE ECONOMY
One of the basic advantages for the Spanish economy of EMU entry was that it could gain the 
necessary credibility to reduce the average level of inflation without incurring real costs which, 
owing to the rigidities in the market for goods and services and for labour, might be consider-
able. Lowering inflation was strictly necessary to reduce the persistent price-increase differen-
tial vis-à-vis our main trading partners. The differential entailed recurrent losses in competitive-
ness that ultimately led to exchange-rate crises and serious episodes of macroeconomic and 
financial instability involving considerable welfare losses.
As can be seen in Table 4.2.1, before monetary integration Spain had consumer infla-
tion levels that were 0.9 pp and 1.3 pp higher than those of the euro area countries and of the 
MARK-UPS IN THE GOODS AND SERVICES MARKET
AND IN THE LABOUR MARKET
As a percentage of GDP
CHART 4.1.4
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
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United States, respectively. In the subsequent period, Spanish inflation fell significantly (by 
1.3 pp), but this did not improve its position relative to the euro area as a whole, since the infla-
tion differential held constant. Nonetheless, a clear improvement relative to the three core euro 
area countries and, above all, to the United States is discernible, despite the fact that their 
consumer-price growth rates were also cut after 1999. 
The source of the across-the-board reduction in inflation in Europe in the past ten 
years was not the lower growth of import prices which, except in the case of Spain (as a con-
sequence of the ERM crisis and the subsequent depreciations of the peseta), had not be-
haved very moderately before the creation of EMU; rather, it was the lower price growth of 
domestically produced goods. From this standpoint, domestic inflation was reduced in the 
Spanish economy, despite which there was an inflation differential of almost 2 pp vis-à-vis the 
euro area (1.4 pp vis-à-vis the United States).
The continued positive inflation differential with respect to the rest of the euro area 
from 1999 gave rise to a continual appreciation of the real exchange rate. To identify the 
sources of this appreciation, domestic inflation can be decomposed into two factors: i) the 
growth of unit labour costs (ULCs) and ii) developments in gross profit margins (the difference 
between inflation and ULCs). Unlike in the US economy, where margins have held at very low 
levels, in the euro area they have risen to some extent, with the weight of the inflation adjust-
ment falling on ULCs and, given the aforementioned slowdown in productivity, on nominal (and 
real) wages. In this respect, Spain is an extreme case in the euro area since the increase in 
margins steepened after 1999, and nominal wages (and ULCs, all the more so given lower 
productivity growth) continued growing at above the related euro area average. That suggests 
that neither wage behaviour nor the formation of business margins appear to have adapted 
fully to the demands of membership of a monetary union, and this is having an adverse effect 
on the competitiveness of our economy. This lack of adaptation is a factor of vulnerability 
whose consequences may be particularly patent if the adjustment coincides with adverse 
external conditions as at present.
From a more structural perspective, the inflation differential of an economy such as 
Spain’s, which belongs to a monetary union but which started with a lower level of welfare, may 
be broken down into three elements. First, a real component, associated with convergence on 
the area’s average level of welfare, which should thus be considered as benign. This is what is 
known as the Balassa-Samuelson effect. The intuition behind this is that the difference in wel-
DOMESTIC COMPONENT
GDP deflator ULC (b) Mark-up
1990-1998 1999-2007 1990-1998 1999-2007 1990-1998 1999-2007 1990-1998 1999-2007 1990-1998 1999-2007
United States 3.1 2.7 2.3 2.4 2.2 2.3 0.1 0.1 -0.6 2.6
EU-3 (c) 2.8 1.8 2.7 1.5 2.4 1.2 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.3
Euro area-12 3.5 2.1 2.3 2.0 2.0 1.5 0.3 0.5 0.3 1.6
Spain 4.4 3.1 4.7 3.8 4.5 2.7 0.2 1.1 1.8 2.1
HICP (a)
IMPORTED
COMPONENT
INFLATION AND ITS COMPONENTS
Average annual rate
TABLE 4.2.1
SOURCES: Eurostat and AMECO.
a. Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices.
b. Unit labour costs.
c. The EU-3 aggregate includes Germany, France and Italy.
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fare levels between two countries lies in the different technological level in the manufacture of 
tradeable goods, while in the production of non-tradeable goods the technologies are much 
more similar. Conversely, the sale prices of tradeable goods should be equal in the two coun-
tries, as there are no restrictions on trade between them. In contrast, the prices of non-trade-
able goods may differ and, indeed, they should be lower in the countries with a lower standard 
of living. As time goes by, the laggard country progressively incorporates the superior technol-
ogy for producing tradeable goods used in the other country, duly increasing the productivity 
and, consequently, workers’ wages in this branch. But as individuals may work in either the 
tradeable or non-tradeable products branch, their wages should be identical, whereupon the 
wages of workers in the non-tradeables branch will also increase. However, as their productiv-
ity does not improve, and given a constant mark-up, the attendant prices will be pushed up-
wards, raising aggregate inflation. Consequently, this model has at least five predictions sus-
ceptible to empirical testing: a) countries with a lower level of welfare will have lower price levels; 
b) convergence in per capita income will entail convergence in price levels, meaning inflation in 
the country that converges will be higher; c) there will, moreover, be dual inflation, with a higher 
increase in prices in the non-tradeable sectors; d) convergence should be determined by high-
er productivity growth in the laggard country; and e) there should also be a productivity growth 
differential between the tradeable and non-tradeable branches. 
The evidence for Spain on the existence of a benign inflation component associated 
with an increase in citizens’ welfare is not overly compelling. True, for the euro area countries 
there is a positive correlation between price and welfare levels (see Chart 4.2.1). Moreover, in 
Spain’s specific case, the increase in the price level relative to the euro area can be seen to 
have been accompanied by convergence in the relative welfare level (Chart 4.2.1 tracks the 
course followed by Spain since 1995).
However, regarding the third prediction of the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis, name-
ly dual inflation, the conclusions differ (see Table 4.2.2). This table shows how in all the coun-
tries and in both periods inflation in the tradeables branches is lower than that in the non-
tradeables branches, suggesting there are other mechanisms, besides real convergence, 
explaining this phenomenon. Further, this is more surprising in Spain’s case since, although 
inflation has fallen following Monetary Union in the tradeables branch, the differential with re-
spect to the euro area has widened. In contrast, in the case of non-tradeables, the reduction 
in inflation has been greater than in tradeables, and the differential with the euro area has nar-
rowed.
PRICE LEVELS AND WELFARE IN THE MONETARY UNION CHART 4.2.1
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Turning to the determinants, in the case of tradeables a generalised improvement 
in the margins of all countries can be seen, which is not overly consistent with the fact that 
EMU entails an increase in transparency and competition among firms. However, this might 
be the result of globalisation, which causes the activities with most value added (those that 
are most profitable) to be retained in the country of origin while externalising labour-inten-
sive activities to the developing countries (note that the weight of industry has fallen over 
these years in all the developed countries). Accordingly, the inflation adjustment has fallen 
on ULCs, which have declined on average in all countries since 1999 except in Spain. 
Conversely, in the case of the non-tradeables branches, accelerations in margins can only 
be seen in the United States and in Spain. In both cases this is the consequence, in par-
ticular, of the construction sector. In contrast, the adjustment of ULCs is much more mod-
erate than in tradeable goods. Lastly, the adjustment in the growth of ULCs in the non-
tradeables branch in Spain has been considerable, due above all to the fact that most 
immigrant employment has been directed towards this sector and that the wages of this 
group are around 20% lower than for nationals; in any event, ULC growth is still far higher 
than in the euro area countries or the United States. 
As earlier highlighted in Table 4.2.3, the growth of both labour productivity and of 
TFP has been lower than in the more advanced countries. As a result the Spanish econo-
my, which started out some distance back, has moved even further from the standards 
NON-TRADEABLESTRADEABLES
GDP deflator ULC (a) Mark-up GDP deflator ULC (a) Mark-up
1990-
1998
1999-
2007
1990-
1998
1999-
2007
1990-
1998
1999-
2007
1990-
1998
1999-
2007
1990-
1998
1999-
2007
1990-
1998
1999-
2007
United States 0.4 0.2 -0.2 -0.6 0.5 0.8 2.7 2.7 3.1 2.4 -0.5 0.3
EU-3 (b) 1.7 0.2 1.7 -0.3 -0.1 0.5 2.7 1.8 2.0 1.5 0.7 0.3
Euro area-12 1.2 0.6 1.4 -0.2 -0.2 0.8 2.4 2.2 2.1 1.8 0.3 0.4
Spain 3.0 2.6 4.9 1.5 -1.9 1.1 5.8 4.3 6.6 3.3 -0.8 0.9
BREAKDOWN OF DOMESTICALLY GENERATED INFLATION
Average annual rate
TABLE 4.2.2
SOURCES: Eurostat and AMECO.
a. Unit labour costs.
b. The EU-3 aggregate includes Germany, France and Italy.
NON-TRADEABLESTRADEABLES
Productivity/hour
worked
Capital/hour worked TFP
Productivity/hour
worked
Capital/hour worked TFP
1990-
1998
1999-
2007
1990-
1998
1999-
2007
1990-
1998
1999-
2007
1990-
1998
1999-
2007
1990-
1998
1999-
2007
1990-
1998
1999-
2007
United States 3.8 5.3 4.0 4.7 2.5 3.8 0.9 2.0 3.2 3.6 -0.5 0.5
EU-3 (a) 2.9 3.0 4.3 3.1 1.5 2.0 1.8 0.9 3.0 2.1 0.5 0.0
Euro area-12 2.9 3.2 4.3 3.2 1.5 2.1 1.5 0.9 2.7 2.0 0.4 0.0
Spain 1.2 1.9 3.2 2.9 0.2 1.0 -1.2 0.0 2.8 2.4 -2.4 -1.0
PRODUCTIVITY IN THE TRADEABLES AND NON-TRADEABLES SECTORS
Average annual rate
TABLE 4.2.3
SOURCES: Eurostat and AMECO.
a. The EU-3 aggregate includes Germany, France and Italy.
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towards which it should aspire to converge. Conceivably, however, this behaviour might be 
due, rather than to the existence of a benign component in the inflation differential, to a 
shift in activity in Spain towards branches, like construction, which are less productive. 
Table 4.2.3 provides some information on this issue. As can readily be seen from a sepa-
rate analysis of productivity developments in the tradeables and non-tradeables branches, 
in all countries and in both sub-periods, productivity in the former branch increases much 
more quickly than in the latter. This suggests, once again, that the Balassa-Samuelson 
hypothesis is not the only argument to warrant a productivity growth differential in favour of 
the branches exposed to international competition in countries with a lower welfare level. 
Furthermore, productivity growth in Spain is lower than that of these countries both in the 
tradeables and non-tradeables branches, and this is not merely the reflection of a lower 
rate of capitalisation in the economy. Yet, on the positive side, the differences in growth 
have been reduced in the EMU membership phase. Lastly, it is also illustrative that the big-
ger increase in aggregate productivity in the United States in the second sub-period is due 
to an acceleration in the tradeables and non-tradeables branches, which is consistent with 
the hypothesis that it is the branches that use and produce ICTs that are responsible for 
this phenomenon.
A second factor potentially behind this inflation differential between Spain and the 
euro area is the considerable pressure of demand that the Spanish productive system has had 
to face. As noted in the previous section, the Spanish economy’s output gap has been positive 
practically since 1999 owing to the reduction in interest rates, the influx of immigrants, the 
expansion of employment and the rise in the value of real assets, among other factors. None-
theless, in the euro area demand pressures remained more contained.
To test whether demand pressure may explain part of the Spanish economy’s inflation 
differential, Chart 4.2.2 performs a very simple exercise. Its vertical axis shows the services 
inflation differential vis-à-vis non-energy industrial goods for the euro area countries (according 
to the harmonised indices of consumer prices for the 1990-2007 period), and its horizontal 
axis shows the trend output gap (which is highly correlated with other gaps that take into ac-
count the restrictions imposed by economic theory) for these same countries over the same 
period. The idea behind this exercise is that if demand pressure has an inflation-increasing 
effect, this should be discernible above all in the price of services, since as these are mostly 
non-tradeable products, they do not have the potentially unlimited supply that tradeable goods 
have via imports, at least in the short run. However, developments in non-energy industrial 
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goods prices should be taken into account in order to normalise (as far as possible) the mon-
etary conditions prevailing in the economy.8
As can be seen, there is a positive (and statistically significant) association be-
tween these two variables, although most of the observations tend to be in the upper sec-
tion of the chart, meaning that on average there is a positive inflation differential (of almost 
2 pp) between the two products. Initially, in the early 1990s, the Spanish economy had one 
of the highest differentials of the countries considered; however, the abrupt adjustment in 
activity in the middle of this decade meant that for two consecutive years (1994 and 1995) 
this differential turned negative.9 Subsequently, the behaviour of this differential in Spain 
has been consistent with the relationship between these two variables in the other euro 
area countries, although most observations tend to be above the regression line. This sug-
gests, first, that the medium-term inflation differential between these two types of products 
has been somewhat wider in Spain’s case and, further, that demand pressure in Spain has 
also been greater.
A further factor potentially contributing to the existence of inflation differentials be-
tween countries belonging to a common monetary area is that which arises from the combina-
tion of expansionary demand shocks (common or specific to each country) with a differing 
degree of real rigidity in product markets and in nominal price inertia. Andrés et al. (2008) show 
how countries with a greater level of competition in their markets have a lesser degree of real 
rigidity in inflation; consequently, in the face of an expansionary demand shock, inflation will 
tend to increase more in the country with less monopoly power. This is due to the fact that the 
more competition a firm has to face, the more its profits will diminish if it does not set prices in 
keeping with its fundamentals. Similarly, the lower the nominal inertia in price setting, the 
greater the reaction of inflation will be to an expansionary demand shock, since prices are less 
dependent on past conditions.
In recent years, many researchers have attempted to analyse whether the euro 
area countries show differences in this respect, by estimating the so-called “new Phillips 
curves”. One of the most systematic analyses is by Rumler (2005), as part of the Inflation 
Persistence Network (IPN) created by the European System of Central Banks to analyse 
this type of issue and to clarify how it might affect monetary policy implementation in the 
area. The main findings are shown in Chart 4.2.3. Here, the degree of sensitivity of inflation 
to the real conditions in the economy (i.e. the inverse of the degree of real rigidity) is identi-
fied by the parameter that multiplies the marginal production costs, while nominal inertia 
corresponds to the parameter that multiplies the inflation of the immediately prior period. 
Evidently, Spain is, with the sole exception of France, the country that shows the greatest 
sensitivity of inflation to the real conditions in the economy, which suggests that there is a 
greater degree of competition in product markets, as corroborated in Estrada (2008). 
Moreover, Spain is the country that has least nominal inertia. This means that, even if all the 
euro area countries had faced identical expansionary demand shocks, inflation in Spain 
would have been higher, the result being an accentuation of the differences associated with 
the fact that the shocks were greater in our case.
8. It could be argued that non-energy industrial goods prices in the HICP also have a large non-tradeable component, 
since they include product marketing margins and trade is (practically) neither imported nor exported. Accordingly, the 
same exercise was repeated normalising with the producer prices of consumer goods, with qualitatively similar results 
being obtained. It was deemed preferable to leave the results with the HICP since these series are obtained with a meth-
odology common to all the countries considered. 9. In the past two decades such an adjustment has only been ob-
served in Germany, on the occasion of reunification (1990 and 1991), and in Finland, following the break-up of the So-
viet Union (1994 and 1995). 
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Nonetheless, translating the inflation differential into losses in competitiveness, 
when a differential cannot be attributed to benign factors, is neither straightforward nor 
immediate. Chart 4.2.4 shows that between 1999 and 2007, despite the deterioration in 
the real exchange rate, Spain’s world export share held stable, unlike the reduction in the 
United States (4 pp) and in the three main euro area economies (over 2 pp).10 Yet it should 
be taken into account that, controlling for size, Spain’s export share in world markets is 
relatively low by international standards. Hence, Spain should seek to increase significant-
ly its share in world trade.
Competitiveness is not only measured by the efficiency with which Spanish products 
are sold abroad, but also by the ease with which foreign products are introduced into our 
economy. From this standpoint the situation is also unfavourable, since the weight of imports 
in final demand rose from 22% in 1998 to 29% in 2007. This is not surprising given the esti-
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10. Specifically, the share held up in Germany, but declined in Italy (0.7 pp) and, above all, in France (1.5 pp).  
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mates in Tables 4.2.2 and 4.2.3, which show how inflation for domestically manufactured 
goods remained higher than that for imported products.
Compounding this deterioration of the trade balance against the background of de-
mand pressures have been other changes that have tended to increase the nation’s net bor-
rowing. Such is the case of the reduction in the tourism balance, the fact that – as a result of 
immigration – Spain has moved from being a net recipient of remittances to a net payer, and 
the fall in net transfers from the European Union (which at one point accounted for 1% of 
GDP), in keeping with the convergence achieved. As a consequence, the nation’s net borrow-
ing has increased to 10% of GDP, in circumstances marked by the high cost of energy im-
ports, when in the past this figure had averaged around 3% (see Chart 4.2.5).
From a sectoral standpoint, it is households and firms that have been chiefly respon-
sible for the large increase in net borrowing. As a result of the real estate boom, these agents 
switched from generating funds to demanding them (this is analysed in greater detail else-
where in the paper). In contrast, the public sector contributed to lessening net borrowing hav-
ing posted successive surpluses from 2005 to 2007. The latest developments show that this 
contribution of the public sector was hardly sustainable, since the surpluses were obtained, 
primarily, due to an increase in revenue that could not be indefinite, since it was closely linked 
to the over-expansion of the real estate sector; that said, public spending growth continued to 
outpace nominal GDP in practically every year of EMU membership. At a greater level of detail, 
both the State and the Social Security system posted significant surpluses, enabling a reserve 
fund for pension payments (currently at over 5% of GDP) to be created that would offset, at 
least in part, the effects of the foreseeable future ageing of the population. In contrast, re-
gional and local governments assumed greater current expenditure obligations financed by 
this extraordinary increase in revenue.
The financing of the external deficit had not posed problems until the international fi-
nancial crises broke. Country-risk premiums had disappeared in practice and Spain was ob-
taining more financing than it needed to cover its domestic requirements. Indeed, Spanish 
firms were able to use funding facilities to press ahead with internationalisation, especially by 
seizing the opportunities arising in Latin America as a consequence of the privatisation of 
former State monopolies. As Chart 4.2.6 shows, Spain changed from being a net recipient of 
foreign direct investment into a net investor. 
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The substantial resources needed were raised through portfolio and other investment 
flows, mainly by Spanish financial institutions through the issuance of covered bonds and 
other simple mortgage-backed securities at relatively long terms and without the moral hazard 
problems implicit in complex securitisation operations. The functioning of these arrangements 
highlighted the non-existence of external financial constraints when a country is part of a mon-
etary union, where what counts is the credit confidence of borrowers, without any interference 
from factors of risk arising directly from the country’s macroeconomic equilibrium situation. 
The absence of this constraint did not, however, mean that the external imbalance was mean-
ingless or that sizeable external net borrowing was not a potential factor of vulnerability. The 
external deficit reflected determinants of income generation and of spending decisions that 
entailed a trend of rising debt that could only be financed abroad and which posed risks in 
terms of sustainability, leaving the economy particularly sensitive to the climate on interna-
tional financial markets. The coincidence of the adjustment of the Spanish economy with the 
emergence of a serious international financial crisis would escalate the potential importance of 
these risks to a level that could hardly have been foreseen. 
4.2.2 REAL ESTATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS
One of the key factors in the growth of economic activity over the past decade was the real 
estate boom. Indeed, when analysing the growth of GDP from the standpoint of demand, it is 
clear that the expansion of the Spanish economy tilted excessively towards investment in 
housing. As Table 4.2.4 shows, the resources allocated to investment in housing increased by 
almost 2 pp in Spain, whereas in the United States, where there was also an intense real es-
tate boom, the weight of such resources in GDP held stable.
The rise in US external debt was the outcome, above all, of a substantial increase in 
consumption, while the greater weight of investment in equipment was offset by fewer re-
sources being allocated to infrastructure. In Spain’s case, although there was considerable 
productive investment and, in recent years, infrastructure investment, this did not suffice to 
check the reallocation of resources towards non-tradeable activities. The corollary of this was 
the enormous increase in the trade deficit and, consequently, in external debt. Conversely, in 
other European countries, as in the United States, infrastructure investment was replaced by 
investment in equipment, but without such expansionary behaviour by private consumption, 
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which resulted in a significant increase in the trade surplus of the euro area as a whole, and 
above all of the three biggest economies, particularly in Germany.
This strong expansion in real estate activity was driven by the availability of abundant 
credit and unskilled labour. As earlier noted, EMU membership entailed a notable reduction in 
interest rates and an increased availability of loanable funds, which gave previously excluded 
groups access to housing and boosted second-home purchases. The buoyancy of credit was 
particularly intense in sectors such as construction where it is easier to provide an asset as 
collateral (see Arce, Campa and Gavilán, 2008). This prompted an increase in construction 
activity and, consequently, an expansion in the demand for labour. Here, Spain had consider-
able reserves to draw on given its high unemployment rate and low participation rate, which 
enabled this demand initially to be met by nationals. Very soon, however, the buoyancy of 
employment triggered, as seen, a sharp increase in immigration, which would re-fuel the de-
mand for residential services.
Yet although supply responded swiftly (Chart 4.2.7 shows how the weight of invest-
ment in housing in GDP began to increase sustainedly from the mid-1990s), it did not suffice 
to prevent a notable climb in house prices as from 1999 (see Chart 4.2.8). As a result housing 
became one of the most profitable and attractive assets, which boosted the demand for it as 
an investment and led to an excessive expansion of the sector. Specifically, at the height of the 
boom there were more than 800,000 housing starts per year, more than in Germany, France 
and Italy combined. The easing of restrictions on construction in response to the expected 
return on real estate projects, despite the rigidities in town planning processes, meant that the 
price elasticity of supply of new housing was particularly high (Bover and Jimeno, 2007). As a 
result, the weight of investment in housing in GDP stood more than 1.5 pp higher than in the 
euro area (see Chart 4.2.7).
Admittedly, Spain’s demographic fundamentals and advantages as a location for 
non-residents’ second homes provide a solid basis for the future demand for housing. But the 
forceful real estate expansion under particularly lax conditions ultimately generated substantial 
excesses both in terms of overpricing and over-production. Given the long lead-times for 
housing and the information shortcomings in this market, the expansion continued even when 
the short-term determinants had already begun to erode the attractiveness of house pur-
chases. Finished housing would thus reach an all-time peak when demand had fallen off 
drastically given the widespread perception of the need for an adjustment following such an 
exceptionally long and intense period of expansion. At the same time, this perception was 
compounded by an international financial crisis whose roots lay deep in the excesses of the 
Private consumption Equipment investment Housing investment
Investment in other 
construction
Trade balance
1990-1998 1999-2007 1990-1998 1999-2007 1990-1998 1999-2007 1990-1998 1999-2007 1990-1998 1999-2007
United States 67.4 70.3 6.8 9.6 4.4 4.8 5.2 4.5 -0.9 -4.7
EU-3 (a) 58.3 58.2 7.0 7.7 6.1 5.5 5.9 5.1 0.4 1.5
Euro area-12 58.4 57.7 7.0 8.1 5.8 5.7 5.9 5.5 0.5 1.1
Spain 60.1 59.9 6.4 8.0 5.0 6.8 8.1 7.7 -1.2 -5.8
EXPENDITURE COMPOSITION OF GDP
Average percentage
TABLE 4.2.4
SOURCES: Eurostat and AMECO.
a. The EU-3 aggregate includes Germany, France and Italy.
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US real estate market. The outcome was the build-up of a large supply surplus that would 
exert pressure to correct the overvaluation. The adjustment of house prices started the change 
in trend in Spain a year earlier than in the United States and in the euro area (the starting point 
was, nonetheless, at a far higher level), although the correction of the overvaluation is following 
a less pronounced path, reflecting the major differences between the characteristics and fun-
damentals of the respective real estate markets (see Chart 4.2.8).
The intensity of the imbalance that built up in the real estate sector ultimately acted 
as the main trigger for the adjustment and for the recessionary trends that would spread 
across the whole of the Spanish economy.
4.2.3 HOUSEHOLD AND CORPORATE DEBT
Developments in Spanish household and corporate credit have been closely linked to the real 
estate boom and to the appreciation of the real exchange rate. The improvement in the Span-
ish economy’s growth expectations as a result of membership of the EU first, and of EMU 
later, the reduction in interest rates and readier access to credit all boosted the rise in Spanish 
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household debt. Much of the growth of credit was used to purchase real estate assets, which 
were very attractive under the new macroeconomic and financial conditions, giving rise to a 
strong increase in house prices and in activity in the residential construction sector. In turn, the 
rise in real estate wealth generated fresh increases in credit, insofar as real estate acted as 
collateral for the granting of new loans.
As regards households, the growth of debt was particularly high following EMU entry. 
As can be seen in Chart 4.2.9, the debt/gross disposable income ratio moved on a rising trend 
from 1995, which became more pronounced from 1999. In the mid-1990s, Spain’s rate of 
indebtedness was higher than the EU average but still below that of the United States and the 
United Kingdom. 
The availability of macroeconomic data on household income, debt and wealth allows 
a more detailed analysis of the extent of the growth of indebtedness. Chart 4.2.10 plots the 
debt/gross wealth ratio against the household income percentile for Spain, Italy and the United 
States, where these data are available. Regarding Spain, there are two significant facts. First, 
the growth of debt between 2002 and 2005 is on a scale similar to that of wealth, so that there 
is scarcely any change in the aforementioned ratio. Second, for the average indebted Spanish 
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household, debt accounts for a low proportion of its assets, albeit somewhat higher than in 
Italy, but lower than in the United States. That said, these differences are greater for house-
holds in the lower part of the income distribution.11
Very rapid growth is also observed in corporate debt. This is associated with the 
strong growth of investment in capital goods and in property, and with the acquisition of assets 
abroad, as part of the internationalisation drive by major Spanish corporations. Chart 4.2.11, 
which shows debt as a percentage of the gross operating surplus plus the financial revenue of 
Spanish non-financial corporations as a whole, suggests that, in this case, the growth of debt 
followed a similar trend to that observed just before EMU entry, accelerating only after 2004.
As with households, the expectations of growth in activity and expansion abroad 
coupled with the significant reduction in borrowing costs explain much of the trend of credit to 
non-financial corporations. In this respect, Marqués, Nieto and del Río (2005) estimate an 
elasticity of credit with respect to activity that is similar to the estimates for other countries. 
However, their estimates suggest that the semi-elasticity of non-financial corporations’ credit 
with respect to the interest rate is higher. This finding may be related to the changes brought 
about in European capital markets by the introduction of the euro, which have led to an in-
crease in the weight of debt issues in the liabilities of European financial institutions [see, for 
example, Hartmann et al. (2003), De Bondt (2002), and Rajan and Zingales (2003)] and, there-
fore, to the fact that credit is more sensitive to the cost of financing.
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11. The discrepancies in the levels of this ratio from country to country are partly the result of differences in the composi-
tion of debt, particularly the high weight of real estate assets in the Spanish household wealth portfolio, and the signifi-
cance of loans to fund investment in education in the United States (see Bover, 2005 and 2008).
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In order to identify the extent to which the growth of the Spanish economy’s indebtedness 
and the property expansion over the period 1999-2008 ended up generating imbalances that 
made an adjustment essential, this section presents a simulation based on a model designed 
for a small open economy. The model used is the literature benchmark for international mac-
roeconomic studies (see, for example, Campa and Gavilán, 2006), in which the economy’s 
representative agent has access to the international capital market and attempts through its 
consumption and saving decisions to maximise present and future utility, in a setting of un-
certainty regarding its future income. As in the classic permanent income model, the agent of 
this economy uses saving in order to avoid fluctuations in its long-term level of consump-
tion.
Chapter 2 of the 2006 Annual Report of the Banco de España presented an initial 
analysis of this question that did not take into account the real estate sector. The results indi-
cated that the increase in debt during this period could only be justified, according to this 
approach, on the basis of very optimistic growth expectations, which assumed that growth 
would remain at above the Spanish economy’s potential rate. In fact, the expectations on 
which the spending and debt decisions were based only made sense if real convergence with 
the income levels of the core euro area countries of the were going to proceed apace. This 
standard model is now extended to incorporate the real estate sector explicitly. Thus, a two-
sector economy is considered, with one sector dedicated to the production of tradeable non-
durable consumer goods and the other to the production of real estate properties, which are 
non-tradeable durable goods. In each sector there is a representative firm that hires labour 
and takes investment decisions on a competitive basis.
The representative household of the economy obtains utility from consumer goods 
(C)  and housing (H), has access to international capital markets at the exogenous interest rate 
r and has a unit of time that it supplies inelastically to the labour market, receiving a wage w. 
Specifically, the agent solves the following intertemporal optimisation problem: 
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subject to
KCs+1 = (1 — δKC) KCs + ICs  ∀ s ≥ t
where δKC denotes the rate of depreciation of capital in this sector and µC and γC provide a 
measure of the convex adjustment costs faced by the firm when it wishes to adjust its level of 
employment and investment, respectively.
The representative firm operating in the real estate sector solves a similar problem to 
the previous one because, apart from employing labour and capital, this firm also acquires on 
the market land (U) at price pU:
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The model is closed with market-clearing equations for labour, housing and land.
Given future paths for interest rates and productivity in the two sectors of the econo-
my and households’ preference for house ownership, this model can be used to analyse 
jointly the behaviour over time of households, in terms of consumption and saving, of firms, in 
terms of employment and investment, of house prices and of the current account balance. 
This model can thus determine the extent to which the recent expansion in Spain of debt and 
of the real estate sector can be explained by the impulses and shocks that have arisen since 
EMU entry.
Table 4.3.1 presents the results of the exercise (the Appendix gives model calibration 
details and the characteristics of the paths assumed for the population and interest rates). As 
can be seen, the model reproduces the most prominent characteristics of the period of expan-
sion rather well: in response to interest rate developments and demographic growth (see 
Charts A1 and A2), external debt rises and a real estate expansion occurs: real estate wealth 
and house prices increase, as does also the weight of the construction sector, in terms of both 
GDP and employment. The model also predicts an increase in rates of investment in both sec-
tors. According to these results the main changes recorded were in the direction that would 
have been expected in view of the behaviour of the fundamental determinants.
However, the model’s quantitative predictions regarding the changes in these varia-
bles are somewhat smaller than the data actually observed in the Spanish economy during the 
first decade of EMU. Thus, both the stock of external debt and the current account balance 
reached significantly higher levels in 2007 than those that might be warranted assuming an 
optimal and rational reaction by domestic agents to the new credit and growth conditions aris-
ing from entry into the euro area, according to this calibrated version of the model of intertem-
poral substitution in consumption. External debt has exceeded the level explained by the 
model, although the deviation is around 10%. In the case of house prices, the calibrated 
model is capable of explaining only 55% of the price actually observed. Even when the limita-
tions with which a model of these characteristics can approximate asset valuations are taken 
into account, this indicates the presence of a component of overvaluation not very different 
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from that estimated by another type of model designed specifically to estimate the contribution 
of the determinants of real estate prices. For example, Ayuso and Restoy (2006) estimated at 
the beginning of the decade a difference between the observed price of housing and its “fun-
damental value” of around 30%. Finally, as regards the reallocation of productive resources 
towards the construction sector, the model also enables excessive expansion of the real es-
tate sector to be identified, since it can only rationalise about 60-66% of the increases actu-
ally observed in the investment rate and employment in the construction sector.
Subject to the caveats appropriate to a quantitative exercise of this nature, its results 
suggest that the increase in household and corporate debt and the real estate expansion ex-
perienced by the Spanish economy during the first few years of EMU are phenomena linked to 
the new opportunities created by membership of a monetary union. In short, as this model 
indicates, it should come as no surprise that in a setting of more accessible credit, low interest 
rates and expectations of future income growth, stimulated by a process of intense employ-
ment creation, Spanish households and firms should increase their indebtedness. Neither is it 
strange that part of this debt should be used for the acquisition of real estate assets, given that 
the formation of new households increased notably and the availability of credit was greater for 
acquisitions of this type of asset. Apparently, however, excessive optimism regarding the fu-
ture generation of income gave rise, at the same time, to excessive indebtedness and house 
price growth beyond, according to the calibration of this model of intertemporal substitution 
for the Spanish economy, what would have been compatible with the actual paths of interest 
rates and economic growth. All this, moreover, led to an excessive allocation of productive 
resources to the construction sector, relative to what could be warranted by this model.
The importance and scale of the excesses identified by this exercise made it inevita-
ble that the Spanish economy would undergo an adjustment process to steer the behaviour 
of indebtedness, the dynamic of real estate asset prices and the allocation of resources to this 
sector towards sustainable paths. There was great uncertainty surrounding the scope and 
intensity of this adjustment, given that it had to take place for the first time under the specific 
restrictions of EMU membership. It was assumed that certain factors arising from the struc-
tural transformations made in the Spanish economy during its transition to a regime of macr-
oeconomic stability would help to cushion its possible consequences. However, unfortunately, 
once the adjustment had begun, at around the beginning of 2007, the international financial 
crisis substantially changed the international economic environment, making the unwinding of 
the imbalances accumulated during the expansion more difficult and costly.
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The strong growth of the Spanish economy in EMU gave way to a sharp slowdown, somewhat 
more gradual in 2007 and gathering pace in 2008. GDP growth rates turned negative in the 
second half of 2008 and a global recession commenced in a contractionary international cli-
mate dominated by exceptional financial strains. The drastic change on the economic front is 
partly attributable to the unavoidable correction of imbalances generated during the expan-
sion, but also to the exceptional conditions in which the adjustment is to be made. The origin 
of the adjustment under way in the Spanish economy is described below, along with the main 
factors involved.
6.1 The dual origin of the crisis
The crisis has two focal points: the first domestic and related to the excesses accumulated 
during the expansion; and the second external and due to the effect of the successive inter-
national financial shocks dating back to July 2007.
As regards the domestic origin of the crisis, the exercise presented in Section 5 is 
suitably illustrative. The greater availability of credit due to EMU membership and the exces-
sively optimistic expectations of rapid per capita income growth led Spanish households and 
firms to take on debt briskly. When, following this initial situation, growth expectations became 
more realistic and credit conditions tightened, consumption and investment decisions had to 
adjust sharply to correct a debt dynamic which proved to be unsustainable. Given the focus 
of spending and debt on acquiring real estate assets, which had pushed house prices and 
residential investment sharply higher, beyond long-term sustainable values, this adjustment 
also brought a considerable curtailment of construction activity and the reallocation of sub-
stantial productive resources to other sectors.
This correction, in itself sharp enough given the scale of the cumulative imbal-
ances, was magnified by the consequences of the serious international financial crises, 
which led to a widespread rise in financing costs for final borrowers and triggered a delev-
eraging of financial institutions with the resulting notable global credit shortage. These 
conditions drastically altered the scenario of world growth, pushing most economies, es-
pecially the more developed ones, into deep recession. The Spanish economy, though not 
directly affected by the shocks and weaknesses which set off this process, could not es-
cape its consequences, especially since it coincided with a deep domestic adjustment 
linked to debt reduction and to over-investment in real estate. Thus, the financial crisis 
acted through various channels to accentuate the slowdown in consumption and invest-
ment and led quite swiftly to a recession in the second half of 2008. The worsening of the 
financial crisis in 2008 Q4 added deep contractionary shocks to consumer and business 
confidence, and tightened and restrained credit conditions for agents heavily reliant on bor-
rowed funds. Furthermore, the global nature of the recession deprived the Spanish econo-
my of the support of external demand, which under normal conditions could have been 
relied on to soften the impact that the necessary adjustment of domestic demand will have 
on growth.
In view of the sharpness of the recession, it is worth analysing the similarities and dif-
ferences of the current downturn with respect to other episodes in which activity also weak-
ened significantly. For this comparison, two other phases in the last 30 years when GDP fell in 
6 The crisis and the adjustment of the Spanish economy
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various quarters were selected as references (1979-1981 and around 1993). As is customary 
in this type of study, the accompanying charts compare the annual growth of certain relevant 
variables over the 20 quarters following the quarter in which GDP peaked in each selected 
phase (1978 Q1, 1990 Q4 and 2006 Q4).
Chart 6.1.1 shows per capita GDP growth in the three periods selected; in this case 
population is used as a normalisation variable, since it is a basic determinant of an economy’s 
growth potential. While at the end of the 1970s its rate of increase was slightly above 1%, at 
the beginning of the 1990s it had fallen to just 0.1% and in the last three years considered it 
recovered to nearly 2%. As can be seen in this chart, the two full recessions considered dif-
fered in depth and length. Thus, at the end of the 1970s, per capita GDP fell somewhat more 
than 1% in only four quarters, which moreover were separated by nearly two years. In con-
trast, at the beginning of the 1990s activity fell by nearly 2% in some quarters, but the rise in 
per capita GDP started to take root only one and a half years after the adjustment began. 
Until 2008 Q3 the intensity of the recession seemed most similar to that of the early 1990s, 
although in 2008 Q4 GDP plummeted. Also, certain factors indicate that it may last longer, 
since many of the factors which enabled activity to resume significant growth rates by 1995 
(gains in the competitiveness of Spanish exports, world growth and readily available financing) 
are hardly likely to be seen this time.
Moving on to the various components of aggregate spending, Charts 6.1.2 and 
6.1.3 compare the performance of per capita private consumption and housing investment, 
also normalised using population. In this case the differences between the various recessions 
are much sharper. Specifically, the adjustment in private consumption is much sharper in 
2007 and 2008; in fact, as early as 2008 Q2, this variable began to fall off in comparison with 
the same period of the preceding year. This slowdown seems to be a logical consequence of 
the high household debt built up, of the financial crisis affecting the world economy and of 
the financial asset price adjustment, which significantly diminished household wealth. Con-
versely, in the 1990s the adjustment of private consumption was in line with that of GDP, 
suggesting it must have been influenced most by the behaviour of disposable income, and in 
the late-1970s recession the adjustment of private consumption was delayed until 1981, 
precisely when the onset of the second oil price shock significantly eroded agents’ purchas-
ing power.
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If these three recessions have anything in common, it is to be found in housing invest-
ment, although this is not always preceded by a significant expansion; in fact, in the 1970s, 
residential investment had been falling since 1975. In the present cycle, this variable initially 
took longer to react than in the 1990s, although it has plummeted to such an extent in the last 
four quarters that the deceleration now exceeds that seen in the whole of the previous reces-
sion. The explanation for this initial higher inertia probably lies in the way this variable is re-
corded: on the one hand, every house built is considered as sold (i.e. there is no change in 
inventories), and, on the other, only the part of the house built in that quarter is considered as 
investment. However, the data for the last four quarters indicate that a large number of unfin-
ished housing developments are being abandoned because so many finished homes remain 
unsold. This means that this component of household demand will take some time to recover 
because the finished homes currently held by developers must first be absorbed. But there is 
evidence that, geographically, they are concentrated in coastal provinces, which are not the 
areas of future demand for primary residences.
PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION
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Charts 6.1.4 and 6.1.5 show the rate of investment in capital goods (i.e. the ratio of 
investment in capital goods to GDP) and the growth of the employment rate (i.e. growth of 
employment less that of the population, which can be considered an approximation of the in-
verse of the unemployment rate). As can be seen, the financing raised in the Spanish economy 
in the last few years was not used only for building homes, but also for notably stepping up 
investment in capital goods, which are much more productive. In fact, in comparison with the 
first half of the 1990s, the rate of investment in capital goods is 2 pp higher, and 4 pp up on the 
end of the 1970s. Also, capital goods investment seems to have been much more resilient, at 
least initially. Indeed, in the first nine quarters of economic deceleration, the investment rate 
even rose slightly, unlike at the beginning of the new millennium or in the early 1990s. In any 
event, the outlook is not favourable since this variable is very sensitive to business expectations 
and relies heavily on borrowed funds, which is precisely where the global crisis is concentrated. 
As for the employment rate, the ongoing loss of dynamism (and even decline in the last three 
quarters) does not seem to be sharper than that in the 1990s, although at the end of 2008 it 
intensified notably. Comparison with events in the 1970s is much more complex. In that cycle 
RATE OF INVESTMENT IN EQUIPMENT
As a percentage of GDP
CHART 6.1.4
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the adjustment of employment began much earlier due to structural changes in the Spanish 
economy (the definitive exodus from the countryside) in combination with higher oil prices, 
which rendered certain activities obsolete, and the change of political regime, which meant the 
end of the trade-off between harmonious industrial relations and employment stability.
In any event, the distinguishing feature which best summarises the excesses of the 
Spanish economy in the most recent phase is apparent in Chart 6.1.6, which plots the trade 
balance in real terms as a percentage of GDP in the selected periods. It shows that in the first 
half of the 1990s the trade deficit climbed to 4% of GDP, but following the marked slowdown 
in activity and the devaluation of the peseta (which unlike other exchange rate adjustments was 
very successful and permitted notable gains in competitiveness), a situation of external equilib-
rium was reached which lasted until practically mid-1998. At the end of the 1970s, the trade 
account was virtually in balance. However, this was the result of the Spanish economy’s serious 
difficulties in attracting external funds, given the problems of confidence raised by the delicate 
political and economic situation. Evidence of these difficulties is that in spite of this external 
equilibrium, the peseta had to be devalued in 1982, which resulted in a widening of the trade 
surplus. By contrast, at the beginning of the current recession, the external deficit stood at 10% 
of GDP. Obviously, this reflects the fact that the excess demand of the Spanish economy in 
these years has been much larger than is reflected in traditional calculations of the output gap 
(probably due to difficulties in separating the growth of supply in the Spanish economy from 
that of demand), but it also indicates that there is a problem of competitiveness.
It has become considerably harder to sustain this imbalance, even in the short run, 
because of the difficulty in financing it on reasonable terms due to the nature of the global crisis. 
The need for a domestic adjustment, in the form of a downward adjustment in relative prices 
(competitiveness) or in quantities (real income) or a combination of the two, has thus become 
more pressing. This adjustment has in fact already been set in train in the last two quarters, 
sharpening drastically in 2008 Q4 when housing investment plummeted and private consump-
tion and capital goods investment could hold up no longer. Although, unlike in the previous two 
slumps, the devaluation of the currency is not available as a means of reducing this imbalance, 
there are two factors which will make this adjustment somewhat less painful: first, the signifi-
cant interest rate cuts worldwide, which will reduce the external debt burden by nearly 2 pp 
relative to GDP (the Spanish gross external debt is around 80% of GDP), and second, the drop 
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in oil prices, which represents another 2 pp of GDP, since Spain uses this commodity inten-
sively. All this does not obviate the need for a lasting improvement in the competitiveness of the 
economy to lay the foundations for a sustained recovery in activity, since both these cushioning 
factors will return to higher levels when the international situation improves.
6.2 The nature of the adjustment of the Spanish economy
The scale and intensity of the prevailing contractionary trends reflect the great importance of 
the adjustment needed by the economy and the role played here by Spanish EMU member-
ship and by the structural conditioning factors derived from the transformations and reforms 
made. The specific characteristics of the adjustment process within a monetary union are well 
known [see, for example, Blanchard (2001) and Muscatelli et al. (2005)]. When a country be-
longing to a monetary union grows faster than the other members due to an increase in do-
mestic demand and a positive inflation differential (and hence a real appreciation of the ex-
change rate and a worsening of the external deficit), the domestic and external balance has to 
be restored using fiscal policy to control domestic demand growth and through reform of the 
price- and wage-setting mechanism to limit real exchange rate appreciation.
Spanish fiscal policy during the expansion, although enabling some fiscal consolida-
tion and budget surpluses, was not sufficiently countercyclical. Chart 6.2.1 shows public debt 
in terms of GDP in various euro area countries. As can be seen, although in Spain it decreased 
significantly, and in fact more than in other European countries, government saving did not 
increase enough to offset the sharp rise in the debt of domestic private agents.
It was thus not until mid-2006 and, more visibly, during 2007, that the strong growth 
of domestic demand began to be corrected. At first the moderation was from the construction 
sector, where activity levels began to flag as the high price rises dampened demand for hous-
ing. However, as earlier analysed, the adjustment of domestic demand was soon widespread 
and rapidly in train due to the linkage of domestic imbalances with the global financial crisis. 
This meant that the framework defining the possible contribution of fiscal policy to the adjust-
ment was drastically altered. The scenario of necessary moderation of domestic demand gave 
way, in the space of a few months, to one of severe contraction, with a serious deterioration 
of confidence and widespread curtailment of spending decisions. The overriding consideration 
in this setting was the contribution that fiscal policy could make to sustaining domestic de-
mand.
In this vein, the approaches proposed to tackle the crisis at the international level in-
clude ambitious, coordinated fiscal stimuli, albeit tailored to the conditions and leeway existing 
in each country. Spain, which had recorded some surplus in its public finances during the 
expansion and where public-sector debt had been notably reduced, initially enjoyed some 
headroom to stimulate consumption and investment through increased government spending 
and tax cuts. In fact, this leeway enabled it to take expansionary fiscal measures fairly early. 
However, the budgetary effects of these measures have coincided with the emergence of a 
strong impact from the cyclical slowdown and, above all, from the real estate-related fall in tax 
revenue, which has shown a much higher sensitivity than commonly assumed [see De Castro 
et al. (2008)]. The potential margin for manoeuvre initially available for fiscal stimulus seems to 
have been largely exhausted. In any event, any action is constrained by the need to preserve 
medium-term budgetary stability. Otherwise, a sizeable public deficit could build up and be-
come an additional handicap to negotiating the recession, given the possible impact on con-
fidence and country-risk premiums which may activate Ricardian mechanisms leading public 
expansionary impulses to be offset by the possible crowding-out of private spending.
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In any event, the contraction of demand does not change the nature of certain es-
sential aspects of the necessary adjustment of the Spanish economy. In the short run, 
emerging from the crisis depends essentially on the normalisation of financial markets and 
on the length and depth of the international economic recession. However, over a longer 
time horizon, once normality has been restored, the adjustment of the Spanish economy 
will depend basically on the existence of a competitive position enabling the sustained 
growth of domestic and external demand. In a monetary union where the currency is shared 
with the other euro area countries, the decisive factors in making this possible will be the 
future course of productivity growth and the response by production costs to market con-
ditions.
The growth rate of productivity is important for many reasons. First, higher productiv-
ity growth enables, for a given growth rate of production costs, firmer containment of inflation 
and thus an improvement in the real exchange rate and in the contribution of external demand 
to the generation of value added. This is important not only for the shift needed during the 
process of adjustment, but also in order to achieve a more balanced growth pattern. Moreo-
ver, more vigorous productivity is the only way to underpin expectations of higher future in-
come for households and firms that will make the existing level of debt assumable and enable 
domestic spending to be resumed on a sustainable basis. Finally, an increase in productivity in 
some sectors may be decisive for creating the jobs needed to accommodate surplus con-
struction workers.
The behaviour of production costs and of the structural and institutional factors 
involved in their formation will play a major role in absorbing the real appreciation, particu-
larly given the slowness with which productivity gains attributable to genuine improvements 
in the economy’s efficiency rather than merely to the results of the employment adjustment 
may be achieved. Leaving the entire drive to realign relative prices between countries to 
active or passive productivity improvement, i.e. that achieved by destroying jobs, may turn 
out to be very slow and costly in both economic and social terms, since it shifts most of the 
costs to those who lose their jobs or cannot find one. The effective containment of produc-
tion costs and of business margins so that they grow more slowly than in the rest of the 
euro area, reversing at least partially the imbalance that built up during the expansion, may 
substantially alleviate the depth and length of the adjustment, particularly in regard to job 
destruction, and significantly contribute to the recovery of activity and to the correction of 
the external deficit.
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In principle, an adjustment based largely on improved productivity and on the con-
tainment of costs and mark-ups involves considerable difficulties. Fortunately, certain features 
of the Spanish economy derived from changes during the past decade suggest that such an 
adjustment may be less costly now than it would have been in the past. First, EMU member-
ship makes it easier to sustain a pattern of macroeconomic stability based on a common 
monetary policy and on budgetary discipline rules which, though relaxed temporarily to allow 
a fiscal response to the current situation, reduce the risk of fiscal measures being taken that 
jeopardise the sustainability of public finances. Second, the demographic change driven by 
immigration and the definitive incorporation of women into the labour market not only have 
consequences for future consumption and investment, but also seem to have made for more 
flexible behaviour of the labour market. Nevertheless, structural problems in the functioning of 
some markets persist. These derive from regulation which does not sufficiently encourage the 
required competition and flexibility, and will require more ambitious reforms to resolve them.
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Spain’s participation in EMU has been a major achievement from the standpoint of the historical 
performance of the macroeconomic determinants of growth. It has set in place the regime of 
stability needed to modernise the economy and assimilate the patterns of the more advanced 
European countries. Also, some of the factors which had recurrently stifled economic dyna-
mism have been eliminated. EMU membership has borne fruit in the form of the longest expan-
sionary phase in recent economic history and a big step forward in the degree of convergence 
with the income and welfare levels of the euro area. The experience, however, has not been free 
from constraints in the form of a build-up of imbalances leading to a necessary correction, 
which has finally come about under the adverse conditions of a serious international crisis.
Most of Spain’s EMU membership experience has been notably influenced by con-
siderably accommodative international monetary and financial conditions, as a result of the 
perception that the prevailing macroeconomic stability was sustainable, a view finally shown to 
have little basis. Also, the global financial imbalances, with large capital flows moving from 
emerging countries and commodity producers to more developed countries and financial sys-
tem regulation insufficiently focused on economic cycle stabilisation, led to an international 
climate of risk undervaluation and rapid debt growth which encouraged levels of leverage 
never previously witnessed. Moreover, in the euro area, interest rates remained predominantly 
lower than at any other time in the past, conditioned by the structural weaknesses of central 
European countries which curbed their spending and growth rates.
In the case of the Spanish economy, the effects of the financial laxity were magnified 
by the low initial level of indebtedness, associated both with the considerable corporate and 
household financial restructuring induced by the early-1990s recession and with the significant 
risk premiums that had been borne by an economy such as Spain, which had used currency 
devaluation as a rebalancing tool. Further, the nominal adjustment of the economy and the 
ever-firmer expectations of joining EMU as a founding member pushed interest rates progres-
sively lower from 1995. This shifted the demand for credit to variable-rate debt, which enabled 
the advantages of economic convergence to be rapidly exploited. Those years saw many op-
portunities for Spanish firms to expand internationally, since the privatisation of state-owned 
firms allowed them to undertake numerous highly leveraged acquisitions.
All these factors heightened the risks associated with the surge in debt and gave rise 
to a spending structure and, consequently, a specialisation of the economy that would prove 
insufficiently competitive in the medium term. In particular, on the demand side there was a 
considerable expansion of consumption and residential investment to the detriment of net 
exports and productive investment. Much of the increase in consumption did not give rise to 
higher domestic production, but rather to imports from abroad, while domestic productive 
resources were increasingly redirected towards construction. Despite notable expansion of 
the housing supply, house prices rose sharply, prompting an overvaluation which impacted the 
balance sheets of all institutional sectors (households, firms and the public sector).
Against this background, immigration probably mitigated to some extent this consid-
erable demand pressure because it expanded supply somewhat, but it also caused other 
imbalances. First, migrants’ low level of skills and, consequently, low wages added to the 
Spanish economy’s tendency to over-specialise in construction activities and low-value-added 
services. In addition, these low wages and the magnitude of the migratory flow masked at ag-
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gregate level the fact that the more stable core of the labour market was enjoying higher wage 
growth than was compatible with nominal stability of the economy and that, therefore, an 
adjustment was required. Consequently, the flexibility provided by immigrants may have acted 
as a substitute for the institutional reforms needed to adjust the labour market to macroeco-
nomic shocks, especially through changes in relative labour prices (i.e. real wages), rather than 
in quantities (unemployment) as has hitherto been the case.
From the standpoint of the public sector, the specialisation in these economic sectors 
and the asset overvaluation made for a sharp increase in tax revenue which facilitated the 
budgetary adjustment. Obviously, the fiscal consolidation and the reduction of general govern-
ment debt made the Spanish economy more resilient; but taking into account the composition 
of its growth and the dynamic of widening domestic and external imbalances, the effort should 
have been greater. That safety margin is thus rapidly being exhausted. Specifically, local and 
regional governments should have posted a positive contribution to the public-sector surplus 
instead of taking on new spending obligations of a permanent nature to be met from income 
whose previous growth rate they were unable to maintain.
The intensity and length of the expansionary phase enjoyed by the Spanish economy 
made other structural reforms in the goods and services markets and in the corporate area 
less pressing. Before and for a time after Spain joined EMU, the need for reforms gave rise to 
resolute action which subsequently petered out. This was probably a result of the strong 
progress towards real convergence, which masked the fact that it rested on temporary foun-
dations (the rise in the employment rate), while productivity remained notably weak. In fact, the 
policies to improve the efficiency of the economy were adopted belatedly.
Although this key determinant of the competitiveness of the economy was not mak-
ing sufficient headway, the ease with which the growing external imbalance could be financed 
induced a tolerance of this phenomenon which led to the over-indebtedness of the private 
sector of the economy.
All these factors combined to delay the impending adjustment in the Spanish econo-
my until end-2006, and it was only undertaken gradually in 2007. The eruption of the interna-
tional financial crisis in summer 2008 and the subsequent global recession made it very diffi-
cult for Spain to keep financing its external deficit. This ruled out the possibility of a “soft 
landing” and precipitated a brusque adjustment which swept the economy into a recession 
deeper than that seen in the first half of the 1990s.
The seriousness of the financial and contractionary trends led, as in all countries, to 
emergency measures to alleviate the consequences of the financial tightening and prevent a sud-
den paralysis of spending. They are necessary measures but are per se unlikely to produce a 
change in trend. The outcome of this complex situation depends largely on whether the world 
economy will be able to emerge from the global recession and restore the intermediation function 
of the financial system. The Spanish economy, however, faces the challenge of an adjustment 
within the euro area in particularly adverse circumstances. The means available to it are its demo-
graphic dynamism and the flexibility achieved through certain structural reforms implemented in 
the past, particularly in the field of privatisation and market liberalisation. But it has yet to under-
take other reforms in the area of services and, above all, in the labour market, where the continu-
ing basic inefficiency of adjustment is leading to rampant unemployment, as in previous reces-
sions, which propagates and magnifies the contractionary forces. Structural measures are the 
main instrument the authorities have to prevent the recession turning into a long deviation from 
the potential growth achievable by the Spanish economy within the EMU regime of stability.
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2 Calibration
The model parameters take the following values:
— Discount factor β = 1/(1+0.03)
— Risk aversion  σ = ρ = 2
— Weight of housing in utility Z = 0.987
— Weight of capital in production of C αC = 0.375 
— Weight of capital in production of H αH = 0.20 
— Weight of land in production of H 1- θ = 0.10  
— Capital depreciation ratio in C δKC = 0.05 
— Capital depreciation ratio in H δKH = 0.09  
— Housing depreciation ratio δH = 0.018  
— Investment adjustment cost in C γC = 70
— Investment adjustment cost in H γH = 70
— Labour adjustment cost in C µC = 5
— Labour adjustment cost in H µH = 70
Rationale behind the values used:
— The value ofe Z, δKC, δKH and of the initial foreign bonds is fixed so as to reprodu-
ce in the steady state of the economy the following ratios observed in 1998:
1 Real estate wealth/GDP 277% (BdE) 277.7%  (model)
2 Sector C investment/GDP 22.4% (BBVA-IVIE) 22.25% (model)
3 Sector H investment/GDP 0.62% (BBVA-IVIE) 0.68% (model)
4 IIP/GDP –29.7% (BdE) –29.6% (model)
— The value of the parameters reflecting investment and labour adjustment costs is 
set so that there are smooth transitions in these variables in both sectors.
— The other parameters are set at standard values from the literature. 
In the steady state of this economy, in addition to the values of ratios 1-4, we have:
— Sector H GDP/GDP 6.7% (BdE) 5.0% (model)
— Sector H employment/
  Employment 10.3% (BdE-EPA) 5.72% (model)
— Private consumption/GDP 58.7% (BdE) 53.18% (model)
— Government spending/GDP 18% (BdE) 18% (model)
— Current account/GDP 0% (BdE) 0% (model)
APPENDIX: A model of intertemporal substitution of consumption calibrated
for the Spanish economy (1999-2008)
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3 Exercise
Starting from the steady state (calibrated to resemble the Spanish economy in 1998), 
it is assumed that the economy receives the following shocks:
1 The blue line shows employment in Spain between 1998 and 2007 according to 
the Spanish Labour Force Survey (1998=1). It is assumed that after 2007 emplo-
yment remains unchanged at the level reached in 2007. In the exercise a smoo-
thed version of the observed data is used (pink line).
2 Interest rates behave as follows in the data and in the exercise:
 In 1998 the interest rate was 3% in both the steady state and in the short-term 
real interest rates reported by the OECD. From 1998, interest rates behave basi-
cally in line with the smoothed data of the OECD until 2008, and rates are consi-
dered to return to 3% between 2008 and 2014. 
3 From 1998, the amount of land, which is created exogenously in the economy in 
each period and is used to produce dwellings, falls by 10% per annum until it re-
aches a new steady state value. This value assumes half of the steady state value 
in 1998.
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4 To reflect the fact that in the period the household structure has changed towards 
one which demands more dwellings (smaller households, etc.), it is assumed, as 
a reduced-form representation of this phenomenon, that there is an increase in 
the parameter governing the weight of housing in utility.
 Specifically, Z is assumed to rise from 0.987 to 1.25, which means that in the 
steady state of 1998 the equilibrium housing stock is (approximately) 10% higher. 
In other words, it is assumed that the changes in the household structure (or in 
the preference for a second residence) would, on their own, have entailed a rise 
of 10% in the housing stock.
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